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Abstract 
A key argument in recent theorizing on the drivers
of bureaucratic behaviour is that agencies seek to
establish and maintain a unique reputation. While
recent years have witnessed substantial empirical
support for this claim, the field lacks comparative
examinations of the dynamics of reputation and its
management throughout crisis periods. This article
draws on a systematic media content analysis to
explore the exposure and communication responses
of the German, Belgian and Danish financial regu-
lators to reputational threats before, during, and af-
ter the financial crisis. Our results point at the dy-
namic and context-sensitive nature of reputation
management.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Keywords: Bureaucratic reputation, agency auton-
omy, regulatory agencies, financial crisis, structur-
al reform 
 Zusammenfassung 
Im Kreuzfeuer der öffentlichen Aufmerksamkeit: 
Europäische Finanzmarktregulierer vor, während, 
und nach der Finanzkrise 
Ein zentrales Argument der aktuellen Literatur zu
bürokratischem Entscheidungsverhalten lautet, 
dass Behörden danach streben, eine einzigartige
Reputation zu erlangen und aufrechtzuerhalten.
Diese Aussage wurde in den vergangenen Jahren in
zahlreichen empirischen Studien bestätigt. Aller-
dings liegen bislang keine vergleichenden Analy-
sen vor, die sich mit der Veränderung bürokrati-
scher Reputation und dem Reputationsmanagement
in Krisenzeiten auseinandersetzen. Der vorliegende
Beitrag untersucht auf der Grundlage einer syste-
matischen Medienanalyse, welchen reputationsbe-
zogenen Bedrohungen die Finanzmarktbehörden in 
Deutschland, Belgien und Dänemark vor, während
und nach der Finanzkrise ausgesetzt waren und wie
diese hierauf mit Hilfe öffentlicher Kommunikati-
on reagiert haben. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass Re-
putationsmanagement zeitlichen Schwankungen 
unterliegt und kontextabhängig ist. 
 
Schlagworte: Bürokratische Reputation, behördli-
che Autonomie, Regulierungsbehörden, Finanz-
marktkrise, Strukturreform 
1 Introduction 
This article contributes to a growing body of literature that has established reputation 
as an important motivation for the behaviour of government agencies and their stake-
holders (Busuioc & Lodge, 2017; Carpenter & Krause, 2012). Whereas institutional 
political science has long focused on the authority of political principals to control 
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agencies, reputation-based approaches shed light on reputation as a source of bureau-
cratic power (Maor, 2015). In a context of information overload, individuals make 
choices based on impressions and experiences, or in other words: on reputation (Canel 
& Luoma-aho, 2019). Therefore, favourable and unique reputations serve as valuable 
assets for agencies to forge power and autonomy (Carpenter, 2001). Not surprisingly, 
then, agencies have been found to be concerned with how they are externally perceived 
and to react strategically to threats to their reputation.  
This article addresses several shortcomings in the literature on bureaucratic reputa-
tion theory. First, bureaucratic reputation theory predicts that reputation-seeking agen-
cies will react differently to public allegations targeted at different areas of agency ac-
tivity. The literature shows that agencies calibrate their responses to the reputational 
costs of public allegations (Gilad, Maor, & Bloom, 2015; Maor, Gilad, & Bloom, 
2013). The empirical literature testing this core claim in bureaucratic reputation theory 
is, however, limited in scope and in particular lacks validation across various national 
contexts. The theory’s assumptions have mainly been tested for agencies in the United 
States (Carpenter, 2010a, 2010b), Israel (Gilad et al., 2015; Maor et al., 2013), and 
Australia (Maor & Sulitzeanu-Kenan, 2016). The article addresses this limitation by 
studying reputational threats and agencies’ responses for agencies with similar tasks in 
three European countries.  
Second, the concept of reputation is multi-dimensional. For instance, agencies 
scoring high on performative reputation (the agency’s ability to achieve its mission) 
may not necessarily score high on procedural reputation (the agency’s respect of norms 
and procedures of appropriate decision-making) (Carpenter & Krause, 2012). However, 
despite the intuitively powerful distinction between different reputational dimensions, 
this idea has received limited empirical attention so far (but see Christensen & Lodge, 
2018). Hence, we do not know whether agencies are systematically exposed to some 
types of allegations rather than others, and whether they respond differently towards 
allegations addressing different dimensions of bureaucratic reputation. The article 
contributes to the literature by systematically analysing agencies’ exposure and 
reactions to threats directed at performative reputation.  
Third, although several authors have studied agencies’ decision-making and com-
munication in times of crisis (Carpenter, 2010a; Moschella & Pinto, 2018), we do not 
know whether agencies respond differently to reputational threats under crisis 
conditions as opposed to ‘business-as-usual’ conditions. Although reputation threats 
may be linked to an institutional crisis exposing significant errors of omission or com-
mission in an organization, they may also take the form of criticism of single-case 
decisions or organizational practices well below the (malleable) threshold of a full-
blown crisis. The financial crisis is a unique possibility for studying regulatory agencies 
being exposed to similar types of reputational threats across different national contexts.  
In order to investigate how agencies react to reputational threats under various 
contextual conditions, we explore the exposure and reaction of three European financial 
regulators to reputational threats before, during, and after the financial crisis using 
systematic media content analysis. The article’s comparative research design primarily 
serves as a means to test the robustness of bureaucratic reputation theory across national 
and situational contexts. We use systematic media content analysis and apply a novel 
content coding of major newspapers’ reporting on financial regulators’ reputations in 
Belgium, Denmark and Germany from 2003-2015.1  
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2 Bureaucratic Reputation Theory 
The study of bureaucratic reputation and its implications is a nascent sub-field in the 
study of executive politics (Maor, 2015). A key assumption in bureaucratic reputation 
theory is that government agencies are motivated by a desire to demonstrate 
“reputation uniqueness”, which refers to their ability to create solutions and provide 
services found nowhere else in the polity (Carpenter, 2001, p. 5). For government 
agencies, reputations are valuable political assets that are used to generate public 
support, to achieve autonomy, to protect the agency from attacks, or to attract and 
retain employees (Carpenter, 2002). Bureaucratic reputation scholars are interested in 
how agencies identify and respond to threats to their reputation, which is defined as “a 
set of symbolic beliefs about the unique or separable capacities, roles, and obligations 
of an organization, where these beliefs are embedded in audience networks” 
(Carpenter, 2010b, p. 45). Government agencies are seen as rational and politically 
conscious actors with incentives to avoid reputational damages (Maor, 2015).  
This view stands in contrast to political economy approaches which understand the 
power of agencies as defined by the powers delegated by elected politicians in a 
principal-agent relation. The bureaucratic reputation approach, similar to other 
bureaucratic politics approaches, puts the protection of agency reputation and the 
carving of a distinct turf by public organizations at the centre stage of the analysis 
(Bach & Wegrich, 2019). A theory of bureaucratic reputation is not merely interested 
in how audiences perceive agencies, but assumes that reputation-sensitive agencies 
deliberately engage in managing their reputation among those audiences (Maor, 2015).  
The managing of reputations by government agencies is well documented. A series 
of studies demonstrate how agencies respond to reputational threats by changing the 
timing of their decisions (Carpenter, 2002; Maor & Sulitzeanu-Kenan, 2013), the 
public observability of decisions (Moffitt, 2010), their outputs (Maor & Sulitzeanu-
Kenan, 2016), their priorities (Bækkeskov, 2017), or their strategic communication 
(Christensen & Lodge, 2018; Gilad et al., 2015; Maor et al., 2013; Moschella & Pinto, 
2018). Most empirical applications of reputation theory have focused on regulators, 
most often the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in the United States (Carpenter, 
2010b; Maor & Sulitzeanu-Kenan, 2013; Moffitt, 2010). There is, however, also a 
growing body of literature on financial regulators and central banks using a 
reputational lens (Carpenter, 2010a; Gilad, 2015; Gilad et al., 2015; Maor et al., 2013; 
Moschella & Pinto, 2018). 
Those studies show that regulators operate in an environment comprising diverse 
stakeholders with varying expectations, including elected officials, clientele groups, the 
media, policy experts, and citizens (Carpenter & Krause, 2012). Audiences’ 
expectations can be directed at several dimensions of an agency’s reputation. Carpenter 
(2010b, pp. 45-46) proposes a framework of four reputational dimensions: (1) 
performative, i.e. the ability to execute its tasks effectively, both with respect to 
outcome and output; (2) moral, i.e. the ability to meet normative expectations, such as 
protecting citizens and ensuring transparency; (3) technical, comprising the “expertise” 
and professional qualifications of the organization; and (4) procedural, which refers to 
the organizations’ conformity to procedures and legislation. How agencies perceive, 
process and respond to multiple audiences’ expectations is a core interest of reputation 
theorists (Christensen & Lodge, 2018). Agencies face a major challenge that 
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reputational dimensions “neither stay nor move in harmony” (Carpenter & Krause, 
2012, p. 27): maximizing one dimension might come at the expense of another. 
Audiences have different (and potentially conflicting) expectations about the way the 
agency should exercise its tasks, which ultimately means that agencies have to 
prioritize whether and how to respond to reputational threats. 
While the core assumptions of reputation theory have seen considerable empirical 
validation, several questions remain unanswered. First, empirical studies are limited in 
scope and in particular lack cross-national validation. Most studies have focused on the 
reputation-seeking behaviour of single agencies in a limited number of policy domains. 
This leads to the question whether existing results can be generalized across country 
contexts and policy domains. Are all agencies equally reputation-sensitive, and if not, 
how can we explain these differences (see also Maor, 2015)? This article adds to this 
research agenda by expanding the geographical scope of existing research on financial 
regulators’ reputation management. 
Second, although Daniel P. Carpenter’s (2010b) theoretical conception of 
reputations as multidimensional constructs is widely cited, there are hardly any 
empirical studies that have analysed reputational threats using his four-dimensional 
scheme. An exception is a recent article by Tom Christensen and Martin Lodge (2018) 
who study how agencies manage their reputation through the use of symbols on their 
websites. However, this study does not address agency responses to reputational 
threats, but aims at teasing out country- and domain-specific variation in agencies’ 
exercise of social accountability. Among others, these authors find task-specific 
differences in reputation management. Accordingly, it seems advisable to control for 
tasks when studying agency responses to reputational threats in different contexts. 
Third, reputation scholars have been silent on the question whether regulators’ 
sensitivity to reputational threats, and their subsequent responses, are different in crises 
compared to business-as-usual conditions. Most studies focus on reputation 
management of agencies during normal times, yet differences might be expected 
between day-to-day reputation management and reputation management during crisis 
times (see Bækkeskov, 2017 for a study of reputation management under crisis 
conditions). Christensen and Lodge (2018) speculate that the procedural dimension 
might be more prominent during crises as agencies seek to absolve themselves from 
blame by denying responsibility or by stressing conformity to procedural rules. 
Moreover, a key question is whether crises permanently damage a regulator’s 
reputation, or whether everything turns back to the previous state after the smoke has 
settled. More attention is needed to these dynamics of agency reputation before and 
after a crisis.  
This article will tackle these questions. We explore regulatory agencies’ exposure 
and communication responses to reputational threats before, during and after the global 
financial crisis (2003 - 2015) in Germany, Denmark, and Belgium. As we elaborate 
below, financial regulators in these countries are largely comparable in terms of formal 
autonomy and task portfolio. Quantitative analyses will shed light on the evolution in 
the volume of reputational threats and the communication responses of each regulator 
to these threats. Furthermore, this article is not only interested in the volume of 
reputational threats, but also in their content. We distinguish between threats towards 
the performative dimension of each regulator’s reputation and threats to other 
reputational dimensions. 
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3 Financial Regulators and Reputational Risks 
Most studies using a reputation theory framework investigate regulatory agencies, and 
several studies have focused on the behaviour of financial regulators and central banks 
facing reputational threats (Carpenter, 2010a; Gilad, 2015; Gilad et al., 2015; Maor et 
al., 2013; Moschella & Pinto, 2018). Financial regulators are particularly interesting for 
the study of bureaucratic reputation. First, they are part of the growing population of 
independent regulatory agencies that supervise important economic sectors (Gilardi, 
2008). The financial and sovereign debt crisis of the late 2000s has made clear how 
much modern societies depend on a well-functioning financial sector, which includes 
banking, securities, and insurance. Arguably, cultivating and maintaining a favourable 
reputation among those industries is a crucial element of effective financial regulation. 
Second, regulatory agencies are usually granted wide-ranging powers in both 
policy implementation and formulation (Gilardi, 2008). Importantly, bureaucratic 
reputation theory assumes that organizational behaviour is not primarily driven by 
formal design. The cultivation and maintenance of a distinct reputation rather results 
from autonomous actions of agencies themselves. That said, we assume that formal 
autonomy provides a fertile ground for developing a distinct organizational identity 
that becomes accepted among relevant stakeholders. Moreover, following Anthony M. 
Bertelli, J. Andrew Sinclair and Haram Lee (2015) who stress the importance of 
organizations’ evaluability and identifiability for holding them accountable, we suggest 
that formal autonomy makes regulators more identifiable and their work more 
evaluable compared to less autonomous bodies (Boon, Salomonsen, & Verhoest, 
2018).  
Finally, financial regulators are facing distinct reputational risks, many of which 
have come to the fore in the wake of the financial and sovereign debt crisis. These 
include allegations of lenient enforcement vis-à-vis regulated industries and cosy 
relationships with regulatees (regulatory capture). Another reputational risk consists of 
quite the opposite, including criticism about over-regulation, which is said to affect the 
competitiveness of financial industries. Moreover, financial regulators may face 
allegations of their staff lagging behind the financial industry in terms of expertise. 
While all of these claims have been present during the financial crisis, the claim of a 
lack of effective regulatory standards and their enforcement was arguably most 
prominent (Lodge & Wegrich, 2011). This criticism clearly taps into the performative 
dimension of agency reputation or the ability to achieve its mission (“to get the job 
done”). 
What this implies for the reputational threats of financial regulators is the 
following: if these regulators have been granted substantial independence and the set-
up or reform has been justified with a need for a depoliticized, technocratic regulation 
of the growing financial sector, then a diagnosis of regulatory failure (“not getting the 
job done”) might go to the core of the legitimacy of these institutions. This article 
hence explores if these regulators really have been in the line of fire during the 
financial crisis, the degree to which the performative dimension has been targeted, and 
how these regulators responded to reputational threats. Before moving to the data and 
methods section, we highlight key characteristics of these regulators within the 
respective governmental systems. 
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4 Context: Financial Regulators in Three European Countries 
In the following, we provide an overview of financial regulators in three countries 
(Germany, Belgium and Denmark). This contextual knowledge is necessary for 
understanding the dynamics of reputational threats and praises in different contexts. 
Financial regulators might differ with regard to their formal powers and formal 
autonomy from political oversight, which potentially impacts on how much leeway 
they have to react to reputational threats. Moreover, they are part of complex 
regulatory architectures, where various organizations perform different types of 
regulatory activities. Finally, financial regulators have regularly been subject to reform 
activities, both before and after the financial and sovereign debt crisis.  
4.1 The German Financial Regulator: BaFin  
The German financial regulator, BaFin (Bundesanstalt für 
Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht), was established in 2002 as a result of a merger of three 
sectoral regulators for banking, insurances and financial services. The main argument 
was that changes in the financial sector demanded an integrated regulator able to 
address regulatory issues across these three branches. While the underlying argument 
was one of strengthening oversight by solving coordination problems through 
organizational integration, this argument was also situated in a discourse of regime 
competition between ‘financial market places’. Given that the wider policy context in 
Germany was one of financial market liberalization, limiting regulatory burden was an 
important underlying motive.  
The predecessor organizations of BaFin were semi-autonomous agencies (type 1), 
whereas BaFin is a legally independent agency (type 2) following the classification by 
Sandra van Thiel (2012). This classification will be used throughout this section, as it 
allows us to locate and compare agencies in different countries on a continuum of 
formal autonomy from political oversight. Legally independent agencies (type 2) 
operate at a greater distance from political executives and are delegated more 
managerial autonomy (and often also policy autonomy in substantial decisions) 
compared to semi-autonomous agencies (type 1). 
Although BaFin was granted more formal powers compared to its predecessors, 
especially in terms of managerial autonomy and self-financing through fees collected 
from regulatees, the parent ministry’s formal powers to instruct the agency, including 
single-case decisions, remained untouched. BaFin can thus be characterized as a hybrid 
organization, combining high levels of managerial autonomy (a type 2 agency) with 
low levels of policy autonomy, at least in formal-legal terms (Bach & Jann, 2010). 
However, the parent ministry struggled with keeping the newly created agency under 
control, which could leverage its international activities and its technical expertise to 
increase its actual autonomy (Ruffing, 2015). 
BaFin is part of a complex regulatory architecture. The agency formally reports to 
the Ministry of Finance, which is the key policymaker in financial regulation. In terms 
of policy implementation, BaFin alone is in charge of supervising the securities and 
insurance sectors. For banking regulation, BaFin shares responsibilities with the 
Bundesbank (the central bank), which is in charge of on-site inspections. Although 
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reform plans for concentrating banking supervision within the Bundesbank were tabled 
in 2009, this reallocation of responsibility never materialized (Handke & Zimmermann, 
2012). This reform mainly had a symbolic character aiming to discipline BaFin, which 
was considered as acting too autonomously in international negotiations, and which 
had a rather assertive chief executive at that time (Jochen Sanio). The reform was 
therefore not a ‘rational’ response to inter-organizational coordination problems, which 
according to experts never played an important role during the crisis.  
4.2 The Belgian Financial Regulator: FSMA 
The Belgian financial regulator FSMA (Financial Services and Markets Authority) was 
established on April 1st 2011. As part of a restructuring of the financial regulatory 
architecture in Belgium, FSMA succeeded CBFA (Commissie voor het Bank-, 
Financie- en Assurantiewezen; in English: Banking, Finance and Insurance 
Commission). CBFA itself was the result of a merger in 2004 between the Insurance 
Supervisory Authority and the Banking and Finance Commission.  
FSMA is a legally independent agency (type 2) according to van Thiel (2012). 
FSMA (and CBFA before it) independently carries out the tasks in the general interest 
entrusted to it by parliament. FSMA mainly reports on its activities and decisions by 
means of its annual report and its website. The Chairman of the Management 
Committee, or the Management Committee as a whole, may be heard by the competent 
committees of the Belgian federal parliaments. Individual decisions taken by FSMA 
may be appealed before the administrative or judicial courts. FSMA’s budget is paid 
for by regulatees, within the limits of and according to the specific rules determined by 
Royal Decree. 
In 2011, the Belgian legislature opted to move from an integrated supervisory 
model to a bipartite supervisory model (“Twin Peaks”). In this model, the micro- and 
macro-prudential supervision of financial institutions is grouped at the central bank 
(National Bank), while supervision of the rules of conduct of financial institutions is 
entrusted to another supervisory authority (FSMA). Before, CBFA was responsible for 
the prudential supervision of financial institutions. FSMA acquired new competences 
related to the supervision of financial institutions’ compliance with rules of conduct, 
supervision of distribution of financial products, and financial education of the public. 
Because of the restructuring, about half of CBFA’s personnel moved to the National 
Bank, where they continued to fulfil the prudential supervision roles that were now 
performed by the National Bank. 
4.3 The Danish Financial Regulator: The Danish Financial Supervisory 
Authority (DFSA)  
DFSA was established in January 1988. It has around 297 full-time equivalents and a 
budget of approximately 40 million EUR (Finanstilsynet, 2015). DFSA is a semi-
autonomous agency (type 1) “without any legal independence but with some 
managerial autonomy” (van Thiel, 2012, p. 20, italics in original). It operates under the 
Ministry of Industry, Business and Financial Affairs. However, the minister has no 
hierarchical authority in relation to the agency’s performance of its regulatory 
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functions (which are regulated by law). There is an ordinary hierarchical relation be-
between the minister and the agency only in relation to the provision of information on 
the situation of the financial industry (Ministry of Industry‚ Business and Financial 
Affairs, 2015, p. 164).  
The tasks of DFSA consist of three main parts: (1) supervision of financial 
companies (banks, mortgage-credit institutions, pension and insurance companies) and 
markets through inspection and based on continuous reporting from the companies; (2) 
regulatory tasks by developing rules for regulating the financial area; and (3) 
information tasks by providing insights on the development within the financial sector 
in Denmark through statistics and information (Finanstilsynet, 2015, p. 4).  
In the wake of criticism regarding the agency’s lenient regulatory approach during 
the financial crisis, an independent governing board with seven members appointed by 
the minister was established in 2014. The governing board is tasked with strategic 
decision-making, for instance regarding strategic targets for supervisory activities and 
fundamental supervisory principles. Moreover, it adopts rules and guidelines in areas 
of delegated rulemaking and DFSA’s annual report (Finanstilsynet, 2016). Hence, the 
board holds rather substantial formal powers in relation to the agency’s management, 
which can be interpreted as a reduction in the agency’s autonomy.  
DFSA collaborates with the Danish central bank, Danmarks Nationalbank, which 
operates independently from the political system in Denmark (independence is 
regulated by law). This collaboration is formalized by two collaboration agreements 
(memoranda of understanding). The key purpose of the collaboration is to ensure 
financial stability. The collaboration is performed through various coordination 
committees. The memoranda are described as confirmations of the ”pragmatic and 
informal” collaboration among the parties, explicating that the collaboration is 
performed in respect for the areas of responsibility in view of ensuring financial 
stability and does not ”overrule” the involved authorities’ areas of competence and 
responsibility (Danmarks Nationalbank, 2005, 2014).  
4.4 Financial Regulators Compared 
What are the main similarities and differences between these financial regulators? 
First, in terms of regulators’ formal autonomy, we find that regulators in Belgium and 
Denmark are formally protected from political interference in their regulatory 
activities, which is not the case in Germany, despite BaFin’s independent legal status. 
Second, in all three countries, we find complex regulatory architectures (see on the 
complexity of regulatory architectures Mathieu, Verhoest, & Matthys, 2017). However, 
all three agencies perform largely similar tasks regarding prudential supervision of 
financial institutions, at least until the Belgian regulator was fundamentally 
restructured in the wake of the financial crisis, losing almost half of its staff to the 
central bank. The Danish regulator was re-organized through the establishment of a 
board with considerable powers vis-à-vis the agency’s management. Finally, the 
German regulator ‘survived’ the crisis unscathed.  
What are the implications of those differences and similarities for the quantitative 
analysis of financial regulators and their communicative responses? Until now, 
reputation theory has been silent on the relationship between formal autonomy and 
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reputation-seeking behaviour. Arguably, more formally autonomous regulators poten-
potentially have more discretion in responding to reputational threats, and hence the 
German and Belgian regulators might be more likely to react than the Danish regulator. 
At the same time, the Danish regulator is formally protected from political oversight 
and therefore might have a similar leeway in responding to threats compared to its 
German and Belgian counterparts. All in all, we have no reason to believe that our 
results are driven by differences in the regulators’ formal autonomy. This reasoning 
also squarely fits research showing that there is not necessarily a linear relationship 
between agencies’ formal autonomy and actual autonomy (Bach, 2016). Likewise, all 
three agencies have largely similar tasks, which leads us to expect similar patterns of 
reputation management (Christensen & Lodge, 2018). We might however expect 
reputational threats and response behaviour in Belgium to be different after the 
structural reform, as the Belgian post-reform regulator has a different set of tasks, 
which may attract other types of reputational concerns.   
Overall, the comparison of regulators and regulatory architectures indicates a high 
degree of comparability of the three cases. Hence, according to bureaucratic reputation 
theory, we would expect fairly similar patterns of how financial regulators respond to 
threats targeting their performative reputation. 
5 Data and Methods  
The data consist of coded news articles in three newspapers: Berlingske in Denmark, 
De Standaard in Belgium and Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung in Germany. All three 
are centre-right, quality newspapers published daily and distributed nationwide, and all 
three cover political and business news. To identify articles where the financial 
regulators’ reputation was potentially under threat, we searched for the name of the 
regulator in databases of all articles published in the period from 1st of January 2003 to 
31st of December 2015. After excluding letters, the total sample consists of 7,981 
articles in the three countries.  
We coded whether articles contained a threat to the financial regulator’s reputation. 
The coding was based on a codebook developed by the Danish and Belgian researchers 
as part of a larger project on bureaucratic reputation (the Rep Gov project, see Boon et 
al. (2018)). In total, 984 articles (12.3% of all articles) contained an explicit threat to 
the respective agency’s reputation. If articles had an explicit reputational threat, we 
further classified whether the threat was targeted towards the performative dimension 
of reputation or not. The performative dimension addresses judgments on the quality, 
efficiency and/or effectiveness of the services that are considered an agency’s outputs 
and outcomes. These services can be a set of activities, policy instruments, but also an 
initiative, a program, or a report that is the final manifestation of the agency’s core task 
delivered to society, to politicians or to other public actors (Carpenter, 2010b; 
Carpenter & Krause, 2012).2 In addition, we coded agency responses to the articles 
where a threat was evident.  
While this does not capture all the reputation management activities performed by 
the agencies in relation to their reputation in general and their media reputation in 
particular, it is a well-established way of studying reputation-seeking behaviour of 
regulators (Gilad et al., 2015; Maor et al., 2013). How regulators are held accountable 
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in the media, and how they respond to those allegations, will provide relevant insights 
into the drivers of bureaucratic behaviour, due to the relative importance of an 
organization’s media reputation vis-à-vis other reputations. Moreover, the media serves 
as an important accountability forum, which will pick up agency relations with key 
audiences such as political superiors and stakeholders (Jacobs & Schillemans, 2016). In 
addition, generic reputation research suggests that an organization’s media reputation is 
related to the reputation held by the general public, both in terms of salience and 
valence of specific organizational attributes (Carroll & McCombs, 2003; Deephouse, 
2000).  
To assess intercoder-reliability, three coders from Denmark, Belgium and Germany 
coded 40 articles on the British financial regulator (Financial Services Authority) in 
The Daily Telegraph. The intercoder-reliability coefficient (Krippendorff’s alpha) for 
negative threats and performative threats were 0.80 and 0.74, respectively, and hence at 
an acceptable level.  
To differentiate between before, during and after the financial crisis, we use 
country-specific dates. The dates are taken from an international comparison of the 
financial crisis in the European countries (European Systemic Risk Board, 2017). 
Hence, we operationalize the crisis period independently of our measurement of 
reputational threats. Table 1 lists the defining dates. 
 
Table 1. Timing of financial crisis in Denmark, Belgium and Germany 
 Start of crisis End of crisis management System back to “normal” 
Denmark January 2008 December 2013  December 2013 
Belgium November 2007 December 2012 Ongoing 
Germany August 2007 June 2013  Ongoing 
Source: European Systemic Risk Board (2017). 
 
In the figures below, we counted the threats towards the regulators on a monthly basis 
and calculated the relative share of articles in which the agencies face a reputational 
threat in the total sample of articles. Hence, our data do not merely reflect a higher 
salience of financial regulation during the crisis, but specifically measure (negative) 
attention targeted at the regulators. To better illustrate the development of threats 
across time, we inserted a smoothed, bold line that takes a running mean of the present 
month, three months before and three months after. In the tables, we compare the three 
time periods within the three countries, and even though we collected all articles 
mentioning the regulator, and hence have population data from 2003 - 2015, we 
perform statistical significance testing as data might be prone to stochastic variation 
and/or measurement error, and to make predictions on further cases. In the appendix, 
we included country-specific figures on the threats over time and the logistic regression 
analysis the tables are based upon.  
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6 Media analysis of Reputational threats and agency responses 
We start by briefly presenting descriptive findings on reputational threats over time in 
the three countries. Figure 1 provides an overview of the total and relative number of 
reputational threats per agency (see appendix for country-specific figures including 
absolute and relative numbers of threats). These are aggregated figures that do not 
distinguish between different reputational dimensions under threat. First, we find that 
in all three countries, the number of threats peaks at the onset of the crisis. In Denmark 
and Germany, the peak corresponds with the start of the crisis, while there is a delay in 
the Belgian case. Likewise, at the end of the crisis, the number of threats decreases in 
all countries. This decrease in the number of reputational threats is temporary, 
however, as we observe increases in the number of reputational threats in all three 
countries after the end of the crisis, albeit at overall lower levels.  
That said, we also find that a relatively high level of (relative) threats persists in 
Belgium after the end of the acute crisis management phase. Those threats are to a 
substantial degree related to a controversy surrounding the reappointment of the 
FSMA’s president who was widely perceived as a main responsible for the 
mishandling of the financial crisis. In contrast, the relative share of threats falls below 
crisis levels in Denmark and Germany. Yet these two countries’ regulators, in 
particular the German BaFin, had a much more strained reputation at the outset of the 
crisis. After its establishment, BaFin quickly established a reputation as a ‘harter Hund’ 
(‘tough dog’). Its regulatory style was perceived by the industry not so much as light-
touch, but rather strict, particularly by smaller public and cooperative banks. Hence, 
public criticism prior to the crisis primarily was about the agency’s performative and 
procedural reputation. In contrast, the critique of DFSA prior to the crisis reflected 
allegations of a too reluctant regulatory role. 
Another observation is that the crisis lasted for about the same time in all countries 
(71 months in Denmark and Germany, 61 months in Belgium). What varies, though, is 
the salience during the crisis (the number of articles mentioning the agency) (see Table 
2): In Denmark, 60% of all articles identified and coded were published during the 
crisis; in Belgium (47.6%) and Germany (47.1%), these shares are considerably lower.3 
This suggests that the Danish regulator was under higher pressure during the financial 
crisis relative to the other periods and compared to the Belgian and German ones, 
which might also be reflected in how the Danish regulator responded to reputational 
threats under different contextual conditions (see below).  
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Figure 1. Monthly threats, (a) absolute (b) relative, all countries 
(a) 
 
(b) 
Source: own analysis. 
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Turning to the figures for the individual countries (see Figures A1-A3 in the appendix), 
we see for Denmark (A1) that the absolute number of threats peaks at the start of the 
crisis (one month with around 25 threats) and stays relatively high during the crisis 
period. Just before the crisis ends, the absolute number of threats peaks again and then 
decreases as the crisis is ending. At the beginning of the crisis the agency was, as 
already suggested, accused of taking a too reluctant regulatory approach towards the 
banking sector. In particular, criticism was raised in relation to the bankruptcy of two 
banks in Denmark. During the crisis, there was a change of agency head. At the end of 
the crisis, the agency head was described as ‘a sheriff’ who was accused of being too 
powerful and performing over-regulation.  
In Belgium (A2), the number of threats peaks around one year after the crisis 
started – in 2008, the Belgian banks Fortis and Dexia were running into serious 
problems – and then stays at a relatively high level until halfway through the crisis 
when the number of threats is back at pre-crisis levels. This indicates a rather intensive 
threat level to FSMA that lasted for about two years.  
As to the German regulator, BaFin (A3), the number of threats also peaks around 
the start of the crisis like in the Danish case. The criticism revolved around lenient 
supervision practices, a lack of highly qualified staff, and unilateral regulatory action, 
among others. The increase in threats towards the peak for BaFin is nevertheless not as 
steep as for DFSA in Denmark, which can be attributed to pertinent criticism by public 
and cooperative banks prior to the crisis, as well as a scandal regarding corrupt 
procurement practices. The reputational threats to BaFin were thus far more spread out 
in time compared to its counterparts in Denmark and Belgium.  
Moving to the comparative analysis of reputational threats and agency reactions, 
we look at differences in reputational threats before, during, and after the crisis. Are 
regulators more exposed to criticism during the crisis compared to before/after the 
crisis? Moreover, do levels of reputational threats go ‘back to normal’ after the crisis? 
Table 2 compares threat levels between these three different periods, using three 
pairwise comparisons (before vs. during, before vs. after, during vs. after). In the 
tables, statistically significant differences are present if margins do not share the same 
letter.  
Looking at all kinds of threats (without differentiating between reputational 
dimensions), we find the following statistically significant patterns (Table 2): In 
Germany, the level of threats after the crisis is below the crisis and pre-crisis period, 
hence there is no increase in threat levels in connection to the crisis. In Denmark, we 
find a similar pattern, namely a drop of the level of reputational threats after the crisis 
both compared to the situation before and during the crisis. In Belgium, the pattern is 
different: Here, we observe an increase in threat levels with the onset of the crisis, yet 
other than that, we cannot find any significant differences. This confirms our 
preliminary observation of persistently high levels of reputational threats in Belgium 
after the crisis.  
An important take home message is that major crises do not necessarily translate 
into reputational threats to sectoral regulators. But what can plausibly explain that 
reputational threats ebbed after the crisis in Denmark and Germany whereas they 
remained at crisis levels in Belgium (in terms of the share of negative articles, though 
not in terms of overall attention)? The reform of the Belgian regulator was completed 
before the end of the crisis, yet a major controversy was sparked surrounding the 
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agency’s chief executive, who was reappointed in 2013 despite being blamed for the 
poor handling of the financial crisis. Hence, even though the reform of the regulator 
can be seen as blame avoidance by politicians through “defensive reorganization” (Hood, 
2011, p. 70), which blurs present day organizations’ responsibility for past events, 
several stakeholders continued to hold the agency head accountable for mishandling 
the crisis.  
 
Table 2. Threats before, during and after crisis 
  Salience Threats (% of salience)  
DFSA Before 617 100 (16.2%) A 
(Denmark) During 1,711 241 (14.1%) A 
 After  526 39 (7.4%)  
FSMA Before 509 45 (8.8%) A 
(Belgium) During 616 83 (13.5%) XB 
 After 170 25 (14.7%) AB 
BaFin Before 1,350 178 (13.2%) A 
(Germany) During  1,803 252 (14.0%) A 
 After 679 56 (8.3%)  
Note: Margins sharing the same letter are not significantly different at the 5% level. Margins without any 
letter are significantly different at the 5% level. This only applies to diachronic comparisons within the 
same country. Margins calculated from Table A1.  
Source: own analysis. 
 
We now look more specifically at the performative dimension of reputational threats 
(“did the organization do its job?”) (first results column in Table 3). In all countries, 
the relative share of articles with performative threats relative to other kinds of 
reputational threats increases throughout the period. This increase is statistically 
significant in all countries when comparing before and during the crisis. In Denmark, 
the share of performative threats increases from 73.0% before to 84.6% after, in 
Belgium from 64.4% to 84.0% and in Germany from 55.9% to 70.4%. Moreover, we 
find that performative threats clearly dominate among all reputational threats 
throughout the entire observation period, especially in Denmark and Belgium. 
However, despite an overall increase, we find no statistically significant 
differences between crisis and post-crisis levels of performative threats in any of our 
three countries. This means that even after the crisis ends, performative threats persist. 
In Denmark and Germany, an important difference of post-crisis performative threats 
relative to pre-crisis performative threats is that a smaller percentage of articles also 
include threats to other dimensions after the crisis (second results column in Table 3). 
Put differently, in Denmark and Germany, reputational threats focus more exclusively 
on agency performance, whereas the Belgian regulator increasingly faces other types of 
threats after the crisis. In Belgium, causes of malfunctioning were often linked to (a) 
the regulatory architecture (which was changed in 2011); and (b) the politicized 
character of top officials in institutions within the regulatory architecture (both FSMA 
and National Bank). 
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Table 3. Performative threats before, during and after crisis 
  Performative threats 
(% of articles with threats)  
Multidimensional threats 
(% of articles with performative threats)  
DFSA Before   73 (73.0%) A 30 (41.1%) AB 
(Denmark) During 203 (84.2%) XB 60 (29.6%) AB 
 After    33 (84.6%) AB   7 (21.21%) AB 
FSMA Before   29 (64.4%) A 15 (51.7%) AB 
(Belgium) During   68 (81.9%) XB 24 (35.3%) A 
 After   21 (84.0%) AB 14 (66.7%) AB 
BaFin Before   99 (55.9%)  35 (35.4%) A 
(Germany) During  166 (66.7%) A 54 (32.5%) A 
 After   38 (70.4%) A   6 (15.8%)  
Note: Margins sharing the same letter are not significantly different at the 5% level. Margins without any 
letter are significantly different at the 5% level. This only applies to diachronic comparisons within the 
same country. Margins calculated from Tables A2 and A3.  
Source: own analysis. 
 
Finally, moving to the core of reputation theory, we analyse regulators’ reactions to 
reputational threats (Table 4). We coded regulators’ reactions if they were included in 
the same article containing a reputational threat. There are different types of possible 
reactions, including explicitly not commenting (despite being asked to do so by a 
journalist), explanatory statements, or blame shifting to others. We combined all of 
these categories into one common response category for the present analysis. Although 
we would have preferred to distinguish between agency reactions towards reputational 
versus other kinds of threats in our analysis, we are facing problems of low numbers of 
observations for agency responses. Therefore, we opted for an aggregated analysis of 
agency responses. We hence compare whether agencies remain silent when facing 
criticism as opposed to reacting to this criticism (Maor et al., 2013). 
 
Table 4. Reactions to threats before, during and after crisis 
  Reactions (% of articles with threat) 
DFSA Before 25 (25.0%) A 
(Denmark) During 61 (25.3%) A 
 After    8 (20.5%) A 
FSMA Before 18 (40.0%)  
(Belgium) During 10 (12.1%) A 
 After   3 (12.0%) A 
BaFin Before 36 (20.2%) XB 
(Germany) During  31 (12.3%) A 
 After 12 (21.4%) AB 
Note: Margins sharing the same letter are not significantly different at the 5% level. Margins without any 
letter are significantly different at the 5% level. This only applies to diachronic comparisons within the 
same country.  Margins calculated from Table A4.  
Source: own analysis. 
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The analysis indicates no statistically different change in reactions in Denmark over the 
three periods. This stability of responses is striking, given a clear increase in threats 
during the crisis. For Belgium, the regulator’s responses both during and after the crisis 
are statistically different from before. During the crisis, the Belgian regulator reacted 
much less to reputational threats by using media communication than before the crisis. 
Remarkably, this more reluctant attitude to communicate in media in response to 
reputational threats remained in place after the crisis. For Germany, we find that BaFin 
was less likely to respond to a reputational threat by means of communication during 
the crisis compared to before the crisis. After the crisis we observe again more 
reactions compared to during the crisis, but these are not statistically significant due to 
few observations after the crisis (n=12). Both before and after the crisis, we see the 
same pattern of reactions in Germany.  
Those findings raise interesting questions regarding the generalizability of 
bureaucratic reputation theory. Most importantly, we find that financial regulators in 
different contexts and under changing conditions (before, during, and after the crisis) 
react differently to reputational threats. Whereas regulators responded less to 
reputational threats during the crisis in Belgium and Germany, we do not observe such 
a pattern in Denmark. As argued above, the three agencies do not differ substantially in 
their formal autonomy nor their tasks. A possible explanation might be that the peak of 
the crisis simply did not allow using many resources for reputation management, yet 
this does not explain cross-country differences.  
Another explanation is that this pattern was a more or less deliberate “keeping a 
low profile” blame management strategy during the crisis (Hood, 2011, pp. 58-62). 
This pattern was more pronounced in the Belgian case – and it apparently was not 
successful given the continuing exposure to threats in Belgium – where reputational 
threats remained at a higher level than in Denmark or Germany. Another plausible 
explanation is that both BaFin and FSMA were relatively new organizations (created in 
the early 2000s), which means that the period before the crisis was a time in which they 
attempted to position themselves and to carve out a distinct reputation. DFSA, in 
contrast, was created in 1988, and hence has had enough time to develop into a full-
fledged institutionalized organization that has developed a distinct reputational profile 
guiding the agency’s responses both in times of crises and under business-as-usual 
conditions. 
7 Discussion and Conclusion 
This article has drawn on media content analysis to explore the exposure and response 
of three European financial regulators to reputational threats. Our aim was to compare 
across these cases and over time, in particular to analyse the impact a crisis – the 
financial crisis – has on both the exposure to threats and regulators’ responses. In doing 
so, we intended to bring a more dynamic perspective into debates about agency 
responses to reputational threats. The aim was also to shift attention to the dynamics of 
exposure to threats directed at different reputational dimensions, with a particular focus 
on performative reputation. Our analysis has confirmed some established claims of 
reputation theory, but also has revealed some unexpected dynamics.  
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The financial crisis has indeed put financial regulators into the line of fire as their 
exposure to threats peaked during the crisis, either early on (in Denmark and Germany) 
or with some delay (in Belgium). The significant increase of threats to the performative 
dimension of regulators’ reputations (Table 3) points to the lack of regulatory 
effectiveness that the crisis exposed (see also Lodge & Wegrich, 2011). However, the 
post-crisis development in terms of performative threats shows some substantial 
differences between Denmark and Germany on the one hand and Belgium on the other 
hand. A possible interpretation is that regulators in Denmark and Germany have been 
able to use the crisis as an opportunity for defending and nurturing their reputation. The 
substantial post-crisis institutional reform in Belgium has evidently not contributed to a 
deflection of threats, which kept coming in at crisis level (in relative terms).  
The overall observation regarding regulators’ communicative behaviour is one of 
differential reactions to reputational threats to a core dimension of financial regulators’ 
reputation. While we proposed an explanation at the organizational level above, with 
respect to the differences in responding during the crisis between Denmark on the one 
hand (no change in responses before, during and after the crisis) and Belgium and 
Germany on the other (less responses during the crisis compared to before), another 
tentative explanation is offered by the cross-national perspective, which relates to 
different national political-administrative cultures (Verhoest, van Thiel, Bouckaert, & 
Lægreid, 2012). Denmark can be characterized by a less legalistic Nordic tradition with 
a low power distance and low uncertainty avoidance. Denmark’s political culture is 
rather consensual, having substantial experience with minority cabinets. Furthermore, 
Denmark is characterized by relatively trusting relations between political principals 
and agency heads and has a politically neutral bureaucracy. This stands in contrast to 
Germany and Belgium with strong legalistic traditions, comparatively high power 
distance and uncertainty avoidance, less minimum-winning coalitions, and relative 
distrust and high politicization (particularly in Belgium). Given the relatively 
hierarchical, low-trust and formal nature of political-administrative relations in Belgium 
and Germany, regulators in these countries are potentially more constrained in their 
external communication strategies. However, an empirical analysis of those assumptions 
is beyond the scope of this article. 
Lastly, we should be careful with attributing too much weight to communication 
responses because (a) communication is not necessarily strategic (though one can 
expect that communication becomes more strategic during crisis times); and (b) 
regulators may display strategic behaviour other than by responding in the media. 
Those include the timing of decision-making (Carpenter, 2002; Maor & Sulitzeanu-
Kenan, 2013) or the prioritization of tasks (Gilad, 2015). Moreover, reputational threats 
can also be overcome by non-strategic behaviour like a genuine effort to improve 
performance by adopting new internal working procedures, increasing technical 
expertise and enhancing cooperation with other regulators.  
At the very least, our findings indicate that regulators respond differently to similar 
threats, which calls for a further refinement regarding the scope conditions of 
reputation-seeking behaviour. While we are not able to explore these configurations in 
detail, the implication for bureaucratic reputation theory is a call for methodological 
pluralism and contextual sensibility: it does not seem to make much sense to seek 
general statements about responses of regulators to threats independent from the 
national political and situational context. 
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Appendix 
Figure A1. Monthly threats, (a) absolute (b) relative, DFSA (Denmark) 
(a) 
 
(b) 
Source: own analysis. 
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Figure A2. Monthly threats, (a) absolute (b) relative, FSMA (Belgium) 
(a) 
 
(b) 
Source: own analysis. 
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Figure A3. Monthly threats, (a) absolute (b) relative, BaFin (Germany) 
(a) 
 
(b) 
Source: own analysis. 
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Table A1. Logistic regression, threats or no threats 
 DFSA 
(Denmark) 
FSMA 
(Belgium) 
BaFin 
(Germany) 
Before crisis  (ref.) (ref.) (ref.) 
During crisis -0.165 -0.474* -0.067 
 -(0.129) - (0.196) - (0.105) 
After crisis -0.882*** -0.575* -0.525** 
 - (0.199) - (0.267) - (0.161) 
Constant  -1.643*** -2.333*** -1.885*** 
 - (0.109) - (0.156) - (0.080) 
N -2,854 -1,295 -3,832 
Pseudo R^2  -0.011 -0.008 -0.006 
Note: p: + < 0.10 * < 0.05 ** < 0.01 *** < 0.001. Standard error in parenthesis. 
Source: own analysis. 
 
Table A2. Logistic regression, threat to performative dimension or threat to other 
dimension 
 DFSA 
(Denmark) 
FSMA 
(Belgium) 
BaFin 
(Germany) 
Before crisis  (ref.) (ref.) (ref.) 
During crisis 0.681* 0.917* 0.455* 
 (0.286) (0.422) (0.202) 
After crisis 0.710 1.064+ 0.626+ 
 (0.498) (0.628) (0.334) 
Constant  0.995*** 0.594+ 0.238 
 (0.225) (0.311) (0.151) 
N 380 153 480 
Pseudo R^2  0.016 0.034 0.010 
Note: p: + < 0.10 * < 0.05 ** < 0.01 *** < 0.001. Standard error in parenthesis.  
Source: own analysis. 
 
Table A3. Logistic regression, threat to multiple dimensions or threat to only 
performative dimension 
 DFSA  
(Denmark) 
FSMA 
(Belgium) 
BaFin 
(Germany) 
Before crisis  (ref.) (ref.) (ref.) 
During crisis -0.508+ -0.675 -0.126 
 (0.283) (0.450) (0.268) 
After crisis -0.952+ 0.624 -1.070* 
 (0.488) (0.594) (0.492) 
Constant  -0.360 0.069 -0.604** 
 (0.238) (0.372) (0.210) 
N 309 118 303 
Pseudo R^2  0.013 0.044 0.015 
Note: p: + < 0.10 * < 0.05 ** < 0.01 *** < 0.001. Standard error in parenthesis. 
Source: own analysis. 
In the Line of Fire: European Financial Regulators before, during, and after the Crisis 29 
 
Table A4. Logistic regression, reaction to threats before, during and after crisis 
 DFSA 
(Denmark) 
FSMA 
(Belgium) 
BaFin 
(Germany) 
Before crisis  (ref.) (ref.) (ref.) 
During crisis 0.017 -1.582*** -0.592* 
 (0.274) (0.454) (0.268) 
After crisis -0.256 -1.587* 0.073 
 (0.459) (0.687) (0.375) 
Constant  -1.098*** -0.405 -1.372*** 
 (0.231) (0.304) (0.187) 
N 380 153 486 
Pseudo R^2  0.001 0.092 0.014 
Note: p: + < 0.10 * < 0.05 ** < 0.01 *** < 0.001. Standard error in parenthesis.  
Source: own analysis. 
